中国能源资源行业境外投资的组织方式选择一个微观生产组织控制视角的分析

        The Selection of OFDI Patterns of Chinese Energy Resources Industry： A Perspective of Micro-production Organization Control
    基金：基金项目：本文受国家社会科学基金“依托国际生产组织推进我国对外投资战略与政策研究”（11CJY095）、湖南省社科成果立项基金“全球化生产、组织控制与中国外贸发展”（12CGA001）、湖南省国际经济与国际工程管理研究中心基金项目（121EPMZ2）、教育部人文社会科学研究项目（10YJC790380）的研究资助.
    摘要：本文从微观生产组织控制新视角，探讨对外直接投资的企业权力行为和组织控制机理，并对2003年1月-2012年8月规模以上能源资源行业境外投资案例进行比较研究。结果表明：境外投资企业的组织控制或协调权力都源于企业的特定资源、组织机制或能力；但六大地区主要采用股权并购和战略联盟，没有采用绿地投资的方式，一定程度上说明我国拥有的企业所有权优势不足；偏向采用独资方式，注重获得绝对控制权而不是拥有剩余控制权，是导致大洋洲和北美洲等地区投资失败率较高的一个重要原因；在境外能源资源投资中，比企业股权控制更重要的是企业自身能力和国际话语权。最后，本文提出相应的政策建议。
    This paper, from a perspective of micro-production organization control, investigates the organizational control mechanism of the enterprise＇s power behavior on OFDI, and makes a comparative study by using the overseas investment cases of energy resources enterprises from 2003 to 2012. The result shows that organization control or coordination authority of the foreign investment enterprises comes from the specific resources and the organization mechanism or capacity of the enterprise. However, enterprises in the six regions mainly adopt equity mergers and acquisitions and strategic alliance rather than the method of green field investment, which indicates that Chinese enterprises have few advantages on ownership of enterprises. Chinese enterprises are in favor of sole proprietorship, and pay too much attention to gain absolute right of control rather than residual control right. This is one of the most important reasons for the higher failure rate of the investment in Oceania and North America. To invest in overseas energy resources, enterprise＇s own ability and international voice are more important than the enterprise equity control. The results show that China should contribute to the advantages on enterprise ownership and construct the mechanism and ability of international production organization control.
    关 键 词：能源资源行业 对外投资方式 组织控制 海外并购
    Energy and Resources Industry, Foreign Investment Patterns, Organizational Control, Overseas M＆A
    分 类 号：F740.2F110-0
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