增加管理层薪酬补偿能提高股价信息含量吗？

    Can the Increase in Manager Compensation Improve the Information on Stock Prices？
    摘要：如何减弱管理层的信息优势以缓解代理问题是公司财务领域的基础课题之一。文章通过检验管理层薪酬与股价信息含量的关系来回答这一问题。研究发现，我国上市公司管理层薪酬与股价信息含量负相关，而明晰产权、增加管理层持股以及提高公司整体治理效力能显著降低管理层薪酬与股价信息含量的负相关性。此外，文章还发现国企高管在职消费与股价信息含量也负相关。文章研究结果表明，我国上市公司必须先完善治理结构，才能通过薪酬补偿来激励管理层对外披露更多的信息。
    How to weaken the information advantages of the management to relieve principal-agent problem is a basic topic in corporate finance.This paper provides a solution to this problem through a test of the relationship between manager compensation and the infor- mation on stock prices. It shows that manager compensation in Chinese listed companies is negatively correlated to the information on stock prices, and the clarification of property rights, the increase in managerial shareholding and the rise in overall corporate governance significantly reduce this negative correlation. Furthermore, it also concludes that perquisite consumption of SOE executives is negatively correlated to the information on stock prices. It suggests that listed companies should first perfect governance structure in China to motivate the management to disclose more information through salary compensation.
    关 键 词：管理层薪酬 股价特质性波动 所有权性质 管理层持股 公司治理 在职消费
    manager compensation firm-specific volatility of stock returns nature ofownership managerial shareholding corporate governance perquisite consumption
    分 类 号：F275
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