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    Fiscal Decentralization, Regional Fiscal Competition and Macroeconomic Fluctuations in China
    ZHU Juna and XU Zhiweib
    Summary: Local fiscal conditions undeniably played a crucial role in stabilizing the economy and promoting economic growth during the transformation of the Chinese economy. To cope with the recent financial crisis£¬a larges cale fiscal stimulus plan combining central and local fiscal policies has become one of the most important policy instruments. However, very little recent literature on fiscal policies has discussed the multi layer structure of the Chinese government. In this study, we incorporated the central local government structure into a standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium(DSGE) model. The entire economy was featured with two layers where the local governments implemented various types of fiscal policies. To win the potential competitions between different regions, local governments strategically set their public investment policies to focus on "the gap in regional economic performance". The model was then calibrated based on the central and regional levels of fiscal data.
    To observe the fitting effect of the economic model, we first compared the dynamic results of the total output, investment and consumption with the actual data. The results showed that the corresponding Kydland Prescott variance ratio of the output, investment and consumption in the model was 64%, 47% and 62%, respectively. Using the model, we could explain more than 60% of the fluctuations in the output and consumption and about half of the investment fluctuations, based on fiscal policies and the technology shock. We concluded that the multi layer government DSGE model developed in this study could explain a considerable part of the fluctuations in China¡¯s macro economy. The model enabled us to understand the dynamic effect of the fiscal policy shocks on the entire macro economy. To further analyze the explanatory power of this model with respect to the regional economic fluctuations, we also compared the simulation results of the business cycle statistical characteristics and the actual data from different regions. The statistical results showed that the economic fluctuations in the underdeveloped regions were more volatile than those in the developed regions. In particular, the volatility of the output and the investment in the underdeveloped regions was larger than in the developed regions. This accorded with the literature on cross country comparison. These results revealed that the model had good explanatory power for the regional economic fluctuations.
    The quantitative results showed that the multi layer government structure and the fiscal decentralization performed reasonably well in explaining the Chinese economic cycles. The fiscal competition between local governments provided a key mechanism to amplify the aggregate fluctuations. The local fiscal investment had a positive effect on the local economy and delivered positive spillover effects to the other regions through regional trade. Via counter factual analysis£¬ we found that the deep fiscal decentralization amplified the short term effect of the local fiscal policies and dampened the macroeconomic effects of the central fiscal policies, and also increased the aggregate output and improved social welfare.
    This paper contributes to the literature in the following ways. We introduced a multi region economy into the standard DSGE model and constructed a multi layer government structure, from the viewpoint of which, we distinguished between the disaggregated public expenditures (public consumption and investment) and conducted a quantitative analysis of the dynamic and spillover effects of the local fiscal policies on the macro economy. The introduction of fiscal competition enabled us to quantitatively evaluate the effect of¡±promotion and competition¡± between local governments on the macro economy and the underlying transmission mechanism. Finally, the multi layer government structure allowed us to quantify the shortª²term and longª²term dynamic effects of fiscal decentralization on the Chinese economy.
    Keywords: Multi layer Government; Fiscal Decentralization; Regional Fiscal Competition; Fiscal Policy Evaluation
    JEL Classification£ºC51£¬E12£¬H11
    

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